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1807: ECONOMIC SHOCKS, CONFLICT AND THE SLAVE TRADE
JAMES FENSKE† AND NAMRATA KALA?
ABSTRACT. A large fraction of modern global conflicts have occurred in Africa, resulting in a dis-
proportionate number of fatalities compared to other regions. Many of Africa’s conflicts have deep
historical roots. In this paper, we contribute to understanding the determinants of historical African
conflict by studying an important historical source of conflict: suppression of the slave trade after
1807. We use geo-coded data on African conflicts to uncover a discontinuous increase in conflict
after 1807 in areas affected by the slave trade, indicating that suppression increased the incidence of
conflict between Africans. In West Africa, the slave trade declined. This empowered interests that
rivaled existing authorities, and political leaders resorted to violence in order to maintain their influ-
ence. In West-Central and South-East Africa, slave exports increased after 1807 and were produced
through violence.
1. INTRODUCTION
African conflicts are particularly deadly. Roughly thirty percent of conflicts over the past five
decades have occurred in Africa, and these typically result in twice as many fatalities as conflicts
in other regions (Hoeffler, 2015). Many of Africa’s conflicts have deep historical roots. Legacies
of centuries-old conflict, patterns of local state history, and borders established more than a cen-
tury ago all predict present violence (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014; Depetris-Chauvin, 2016;
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2011). It is important, then, to understand the history of conflict
in Africa. In this paper, we document that adaptation to British suppression of the slave trade after
1807 included an increase in the incidence of intra-African conflict.
The Slave Trade Act of 1807 was enforced through naval patrols on the West African coast and
reinforced by the United States’ prohibition of slave imports in 1808. The effect on slave exports
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FIGURE 1. The importance of 1807
Source: Eltis et al. (1999)
was immediate, and is shown in Figure 1.1 The effect was also heterogeneous. Suppression was
only effective at reducing participation by British nationals and north of the equator (Eltis, 1987).
South of the equator, Brazilian and Portuguese shippers dominated a trade that largely transported
slaves to Brazil. As a result, the slave trade was re-organized. Exports from West Africa fell. By
contrast, exports from West-Central and Southeast Africa expanded after a brief decline.
We use data from Brecke (1999) on conflicts in Africa over the period 1700 to 1900. Assigning
coordinates to each of these conflicts, we then use proximity to slave-trade ports to divide Africa
into a region that was affected by the transatlantic slave trade and a region that was not. We
show that there was a discontinuous increase in the prevalence of conflict between Africans in the
affected region after 1807 relative to the unaffected region.
We show that our main result cannot be explained by more detailed measurement of conflict
in Africa after 1807, differential measurement of conflicts near and further from the coast over
time, greater colonial encroachment, or by the jihads of the early nineteenth century. Our result
is robust to several different specifications, including alternative divisions of Africa into affected
1These figures are estimated using the Eltis et al. (1999) ship-level records. In particular, we use the variables majbyimp
(Imputed principal region of slave purchase) slaximp (Imputed total slaves embarked), and yearaf (Year departed
Africa (imputed)).
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and unaffected regions, and to changes in the time window that we consider. Further, we show that
1807 did not increase conflicts with non-Africans, and that we can only find a structural break in
conflicts amongst Africans around 1807.
What prompted the increase in intra-African violence? We show that the sharp increase in
conflict occurred in both West Africa, where the slave trade declined, and West-Central/Southeast
Africa, which dominated the final decades of the slave trade. In both regions, the restructuring of
the slave trade disrupted the status quo, creating new violence as actors adjusted to the change.
Where demand for slaves increased, they were produced through violence, for example as war
captives. Where demand declined, states that had derived revenues from the slave trade found
their relative power weakened. Authorities used the spoils of conflict to maintain their position.
Of particular importance were the ability to violently acquire slaves that could be used in further
conflict and access to firearms and horses through continued sale of slaves, despite suppression of
the trade.
Why was this increase sustained? While we do not have detailed data with which to test between
the possible explanations for why levels of conflict did not return quickly to baseline, the secondary
literature on both historical and modern conflict in Africa offers several possibilities. Two mech-
anisms that Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) have used to explain the persistence of conflict in
Africa are relevant here: inter-group distrust and poverty. Studies of Angola and Mozambique
have similarly emphasized interethnic rivalries that were worsened by the post-1807 slave trade
when discussing the historical roots of conflict in both countries (Chabal, 2001; Funada-Classen,
2013). The literature on conflict in nineteenth century Africa has similarly discussed many reasons
why these conflicts persisted. These include the weakening of states that had depended on the
slave trade,2 the incentive to leave an enemy intact for future slave raiding and plunder, the need
to engage in conflict in order to obtain the guns and horses needed for self-preservation, and the
sustained external demand for slaves south of the equator. In our empirical results, we show that
conflicts both became more frequent and lasted longer after 1807.
1.1. Related literature. Our principal contribution is to the literature on the economics of con-
flict. First, we show that the effects of economic shocks on conflict can be persistent. The litera-
ture on economic shocks and conflict focuses largely on immediate responses to transitory income
fluctuations and the factors that mitigate them (Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2010; Miguel et al., 2004).
Though empirical work has tested whether slowly-changing variables such as ethnic differences
give rise to conflict (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2010; Esteban et al., 2012) and whether violent
responses to transient shocks have longer-lasting institutional consequences (Dell, 2012), we are
not aware of any study showing persistent violence caused by transient economic shocks. We show
2Depetris-Chauvin (2016) and Heldring (2016) both provide empirical economic studies of the role of states in reduc-
ing conflict in Africa.
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that the increased incidence of intra-African conflict in response to the 1807 shock was sustained
for several years after the initial change.
Second, we add new evidence on the mechanisms by which both positive and negative economic
shocks may precipitate conflict. Existing studies explain the apparently contradictory effects of
both positive and negative shocks in terms of opportunity costs and returns to conflict (Besley
and Persson, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Dube and Vargas, 2013). The set of mechanisms
that has been considered by the empirical literature is small, but expanding. Fenske and Kala
(2015), for example, focus on the returns to predatory, state-led violence in the context of the slave
trade. Here, we focus on the returns to violence and the challenges faced by undemocratic political
authorities in adapting to a new economic order.
Third, we add to the existing evidence that study of the past provides lessons about the rela-
tionship between economic shocks and conflict. Although most empirical work on conflict has
focused on the period after 1945, history provides a larger universe of data with which to test how
the response of conflict to economic variables varies by the type of shock, or by institutions, tech-
nology, and culture. Other studies of historical conflict have found, for example, that the spread
of drought-resistant crops can reduce this responsiveness (Jia, 2014), or that culture can similarly
mitigate the response to shocks (Kung and Ma, 2014). We find conflict to be responsive to trade
shocks, and that this response is attenuated by the availability of alternative income sources – in
our case the ability to produce oil crops that were central to African trade with Europe after 1807.
Our paper is a contribution to the literature on trade and conflict. Because war imposes costs
by disrupting trade (Glick and Taylor, 2010), countries that trade more should be less likely to go
to war. Empirical studies have found support for this claim (Polachek, 1980; Vicard, 2012). Jha
(2013, 2014) finds that long histories of inter-ethnic trade limit conflict in the present. Indeed,
countries enter trade agreements in part to reduce the probability of conflict (Martin et al., 2012).
Other recent work has shown that the relationship between trade and conflict may be more com-
plex. Martin et al. (2008a,b) suggest that multilateral trade reduces the costs of war with any one
trade partner, Nunn and Qian (2014) argue that U.S. food aid increases civil conflict in recipient
countries, and Rohner et al. (2013) emphasize the possibility that low levels of trust in inter-ethnic
trade can perpetuate vicious cycles of recurrent conflict. Our contribution is to focus on trade of a
good whose production is intrinsically violent, and on the unintended consequences of restricting
that trade.
We also make a more minor contribution to the literature on the impact of the slave trade on
Africa. Although the slave trade had many persistent effects, we are not aware of any other em-
pirical paper that focuses on the link between present-day conflict and either the slave trade or its
abolition. Further, existing studies focus on the long-run impacts on income, trust, ethnic strati-
fication, and polygamy (Dalton and Leung, 2014; Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Puga, 2012; Nunn and
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Wantchekon, 2011; Whatley and Gillezeau, 2011b). The only empirical study of which we are
aware that looks at contemporaneous outcomes is Whatley and Gillezeau (2011a).
1.2. Outline. In section 2, we outline our empirical strategy and describe our sources of data. In
section 3, we present our main results and demonstrate their robustness to alternative specifications
and interpretations. In section 4, we interpret our results. We situate our findings in the historical
literature on the African “crisis of adaptation,” and discuss the examples of South-Western Nigeria
and Eastern South Africa. In section 5, we conclude.
2. BACKGROUND, EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
2.1. Background. What led to the Slave Trade Act? Radical writers such as Williams (1944)
have argued that the Slave Trade Act was part of a capitalist assault on barriers to trade. More
mainstream work focuses instead on ideological opposition to slavery by both influential aboli-
tionists and the British public. Slavery and the slave trade became increasingly incompatible with
new ideologies that had grown prevalent in Britain, including ideas of liberty, benevolence, and
happiness (Anstey, 1975, p. 96). Eltis (1987) describes a number of impulses that pushed Britain
towards antislavery, including liberalism, progressivism, and values of laissez-faire, freedom, and
individualism (p.22, 104). Underpinning his analysis is an argument that, in 1807, the slave trade
was still economically profitable for Britain.
Enlightenment figures like Voltaire and Condorcet condemned the trade (Anstey, 1975, p. 122).
Similarly, new currents in Evangelical and Quaker thought turned against slavery (p. 97). Partic-
ularly important was the development of concepts of benevolence and Providence (p. 126). The
evangelical perspective stressed the importance of redemption and atonement, used the old tes-
tament deliverance of the chosen people as a typology for the salvation experience, stressed the
law of love, and emphasised slavery and freedom as analogues of redemption and liberty within
Christianity (p. 186). Oldfield (2012, p. 20) emphasises analogous trends in popular politics, in
particular the growth of compassion, civility, and sociability. Drescher (1994), similarly, focuses
on the role of the British public.
By the 1770s, educated opinion had turned in Britain and slavery had come to be seen as
“morally and philosophically condemned” (Anstey, 1975, p. 239). It was ideological changes
such as these that motivated campaigners such as Clarkson, Sharp and Wilberforce. Their efforts
overcame opposition from the West Indies, the crown, and general concerns about national interest
for a variety of proximate reasons, including the ability to cast it as patriotic vis-a`-vis France, sup-
port by new Irish members of Parliament, the death of Pitt, and tireless lobbying (Anstey, 1975,
p. 343,357,398) . These efforts were supported by hundreds of thousands of Britons who put their
names on petitions demanding an end to the trade (Oldfield, 2012, p. 114).
Abolition of the slave trade came as a series of laws; in 1806 Britain banned British involvement
in the foreign slave trade, including provision of credit; 1807 ended British participation in the
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slave trade and initiated British efforts to press other European countries to do the same; laws
in 1833 and 1838 prohibited slavery in the British Empire, and in 1843 British subjects were
forbidden to hold slaves anywhere (Eltis, 1987, p. 83). Britain began capturing and condemning
Portuguese and Bahian ships as early as 1810 (Eltis, 1987, p. 108,142). Treaties signed with Spain,
Portugal and the Netherlands in 1817 and 1818 gave Britain the right to detain ships trading north
of the equator (p. 86). Further, withdrawal of British credit and goods had an additional, if minor,
effect on the trade of other countries (p. 142). After 1810, increased risk in the slave trade had
become visible in the substitution of specie for goods in outbound cargoes (p. 152).
In West-Central Africa, abolition was inhibited by several factors, including lack of European
sovereignty, a lack of alternative overseas commodity trade, and the ease of avoiding blockading
cruisers (Eltis, 1987, p. 175-6) Britain was also reticent to interfere with the Portuguese South
Atlantic trade because Portugal was a British ally (p. 27). The Portuguese trade also survived
because it was dominated by Brazilians with few connections to Europe, because it rarely moved
North of the equator, staying self-contained, and because Brazilian ports were relatively close to
Africa but distant from Europe (p. 48). By the 1820s, the slave trade had been restructured,
focusing on the Americas and dominated by Spanish and Portuguese slave merchants (p. 146).
2.2. Empirical strategy. Our principal outcome of interest is the number of intra-African con-
flicts occurring in either the region close to slave ports or the region far from slave ports in a given
year. In our baseline analysis, the “near port” region includes areas within 1,000 km of a port
listed in the Eltis et al. (1999) Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, while the comparison region
includes the rest of Africa that is within 2,000 km of a port.3 This cutoff is chosen to capture the
area from which slaves were brought to the coast, and hence the regions likely to be affected by the
slave trade. The estimates in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that the overwhelming majority
of slave exports came from ethnic groups whose centroids were within 1,000 km of the coast; see
Figure A.1 in the appendix. We will show below that alternative definitions such as moving this
cutoff closer to the coast, or alternative related definitions of treatment such as continuous distance
to the coast, do not materially change the results.
We use OLS to estimate:
AfricanConflictIncidenceit = β0 + β1Postt ×NearPorti + β2NearPorti
+ β3Postt + β4Y eart + it(1)
Here, AfricanConflictIncidenceit is the number of intra-African conflicts in region i in year
t. Postt is an indicator for t > 1807. NearPorti is an indicator for areas that were affected by the
ban, since they engaged in the slave trade. We estimate (1) on samples that include years within a
3We do not consider the North African slave trade due to a lack of data on the sources of slave supply and volume of
exports for that region before and after 1807.
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window length W of 1807. We will let W vary from 15 to 40 years. For a given window length,
we will have 2× (2×W + 1) observations.
In our baseline, we will use a Newey-West correction to address serial correlation in our standard
errors. Standard errors produced by bootstrapping (Appendix Table A2) or by using Prais-Winsten
estimation (Appendix Table A7) are very similar to our baseline results.
We estimate two augmented specifications that allow for separate time trends in the two regions,
and for these trends to also change around 1807:
AfricanConflictIncidenceit = β0 + β1Postt ×NearPorti + β2NearPorti
+ β3Postt + β4Y eart + β5Y eart ×NearPorti
+ it,(2)
and:
AfricanConflictIncidenceit = β0 + β1Postt ×NearPorti + β2NearPorti
+ β3Postt + β4Y eart + β5Y eart ×NearPorti
+ β6Post× (Y eart − 1807)
+ β7Post× (Y eart − 1807)×NearPorti
+ it,(3)
In each of (1), (2) and (3), β1 is our primary coefficient of interest. It captures the degree to
which conflict was more common after 1807 than before, above what is predicted by any prior
trend. If the effect of abolition on the incidence of conflict in Africa were to occur more gradually,
it would appear as a change in the trend – as a positive estimate of β7. Similarly, it is possible that
both β1 and β7 increase. In practice, we typically find a more immediate effect.
2.3. Data. Our source of data on the incidence of conflict in Africa is Brecke (1999).4 His purpose
is to document all conflicts over the period 1400 to 1900 in which at least 32 persons are killed in
battle. He assembles these from a large bibliography of secondary sources. His sources include
already-existing lists of conflicts such as Clodfelter (2008), as well as sources specifically focused
on African history such as Ajayi and Crowder (1985), Freeman-Grenville (1973) or McEvedy
(1980).
In particular, Brecke (1999) lists the belligerents, dates, locations, and durations of 677 con-
flicts that took place between 1400 and 1900 in Africa. For example, one entry in his data reads
“Tukulors-Segu (Timbuktoo, Mali), 1863.” We use this information to assign each conflict a set of
coordinates (in this example, 16.78, -3.01) and an indicator for whether both parties are African
4Data and documentation can be downloaded from www.cgeh.nl/data.
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FIGURE 2. Conflicts and proximity to ports, 1400-1900
(in this case, yes). The Brecke (1999) data do, then, record conflicts in the African interior; 22% of
intra-African conflicts he records between 1700 and 1900 occurred in our comparison region that
is further than 1,000 km, but within 2,000 km of the coast.5 Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) show
that conflicts from these data between 1400 and 1700 predict conflict and mistrust today. Iyigun
(2008) uses these data to track the responsiveness of Protestant-Catholic conflict to Ottoman mili-
tary activities. We join these data on conflict to several other sources of geographic data, which we
discuss as they are introduced.6 Several other studies have also used these data, including Parker
(2008), Zhang et al. (2011), Fearon and Laitin (2014), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2011),
Pinker (2011), and Lagerlo¨f (2014).
The Brecke data can be compared to commonly-used alternatives such as Clodfelter (2008) or
Jaques (2007): see Dincecco and Prado (2012) and Gennaioli and Voth (2015) for examples of
papers using these alternative data. Clodfelter’s index for the 1700s does not list any conflicts that
took place in sub-Saharan Africa. The index for the 1800s lists 19 conflicts that took place in sub-
Saharan Africa, as well as five “North African” conflicts involving Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and one
5Other examples of intra-African interior conflicts include “Ethiopia-Funj (northwest Ethiopia), 1735,” “Darfur-Wadai
(Chad), 1739,” and “Luba-Kazembe (Zaire), 1830.”
6Although Brecke reports fatalities data for some conflicts, we do not use this. It is missing for most conflicts in the
data and is reported for less than one third of African conflicts.
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in the Sudan. These are, however, overwhelmingly conflicts involving non-Africans. For example,
the only three sub-Saharan conflicts in his index starting before 1838 are “Portugal’s Colonial Wars
in Africa,” the “Kaffir Wars” (i.e. the Xhosa wars) and the “First Ashanti War.” Similarly, over the
period 1500 to 1800 in which individual events have been coded by Dincecco and Prado (2012),
Clodfelter reports only four events in sub-Saharan Africa: one at Elmina in Ghana, one at Porto
Praya in Cape Verde, one at Dakar in Senegal, and one at Saldanha Bay in South Africa. Each of
these was part of the War of the American Revolution (1775-1783).
Jaques mentions more conflict events in Africa over the period 1400 to 1800: three in Angola,
two in Benin, one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, two in Ethiopia, one in Ghana, six
in Kenya, two in Mali, one in Niger, two in Senegal, one in Somalia, six in South Africa, three in
Sudan or South Sudan, two in Tanzania, and one in Zimbabwe. However, almost all of these events
are conflicts involving Europeans (e.g. “Portuguese Colonial Wars in West Africa”, “Anglo-Dutch
War”). The exceptions are the “Second Ethiopian-Ifat War” (1415), the “Wars of the Songhai Em-
pire” (1468, 1493), the “Funj-Nubian War” (1504-1504), the “Adal-Ethiopian War” (1529, 1543)
the “Moroccan-Songhai War” (1591) the “Rise of Dahomey” (1724-27), and the “Funj-Ethiopian
War” (1730-1755). Similarly, Jacques (2007) only mentions eight intra-African conflicts in the
period 1700-1900.7 Brecke is, then, more comprehensive than the alternative existing datasets that
cover Africa around 1807.
We show the conflicts in the data in Figure 2. The area colored red in the map is the region
that lies within 1,000 km of the slave-trading ports listed in the The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
Database. The blue area is the region that is further than 1,000 km, but within 2,000 km of the
coast. We present summary statistics in Table 1. Two facts are evident from this table. First, the
incidence of conflict is greater in the region that is close to slave ports than in the comparison
region both before and after 1807. Second, the incidence of conflict after 1807 rises in the region
that is close to slave ports, but no comparable increase is evident in the comparison region.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Main result. We present our estimates of (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2. Across specifications,
the estimated increase in intra-African conflict in the region near slave ports after 1807 ranges from
1.5 to 2. This is a large effect, compared with a pre-1807 annual mean of roughly one conflict per
year. Figure 3 depicts these results pictorially, showing both the raw data and our estimates of (3).
The increase in conflict after 1807 occurs rapidly, and appears largely as a level effect, rather than
as a break in the trend. This break is sustained over time. Our estimates of the post-1807 trend
in the affected region after 1807 (β4 + β5 + β6 + β7) are positive, except when we use a 40-year
window, in which case the post-1807 trend is -0.034. Even if the initial increase were eroded at a
rate of 0.034 conflicts per year, it would have taken nearly three decades to erase.
7Funj-Ethiopian War; Mamluk Wars; Rise of Sokoto; Rise of Dahomey; Rise of Shaka Zulu; Sudanese-Ethiopian War;
Zulu Civil War; Zulu Wars of Succession.
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FIGURE 3. The break around 1807
Lines in this figure report predicted values from estimates of (3). In particular, these correspond to the results
presented in column 4 of Table 2. Points correspond to raw data.
3.2. Robustness. The discontinuous increase in intra-African conflict after 1807 is robust to sev-
eral alternative definitions of the two regions, to additional checks for robustness, and to alternative
interpretations of the data. We present our main robustness tests in Table 3.
3.2.1. Definition of proximity to slave ports. We begin by changing the rules used to divide Africa
into two groups. In panel A of Table 3, we define all areas within 1000 km of the coast as part
of the affected region. Similarly, in panel B, we take as treated all areas within 500 km of a port.
Results are similar if we define only areas within 250 km of a port as “affected” (Appendix Table
A3). In panel C, we again take this region as that within 500 km of a port, but we discard the area
between 500 and 1000 km from a port from the analysis. In panel D, we define the “near ports”
zone as the portions of Africa contained within modern-day countries that housed ports listed in the
Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. Similarly, if we divide Africa into four bands, each 500km
wide and defined by their distance from the nearest port, we find that the increase in conflict is
largely confined to areas within 500km of the coast (Appendix Table A3). In the appendix (Table
A4) we remove the comparison zone altogether, and continue to find a discontinuous break around
1807 within the affected zone.
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FIGURE 4. Trend breaks in alternate years
This figure reports coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for β1 from estimates of (2) for alternative
selections of the cutoff year that defines Postt.
In panel E of Table 3, we expand our baseline slave trade region so that it includes the belt of
matrilineal societies south of the equatorial rainforest. Miller (1996) notes that the slaving frontier
of the Angolan societies pushed inwards in the nineteenth century, largely into this zone. Similarly,
slaves exported from Mozambique came increasingly from this region. In order to capture this
area, we include the ethnic groups in this band between Angola and Mozambique that Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011) report as having nonzero slave exports. Results remain similar to our baseline
analysis.
3.2.2. Other robustness. We conduct a variety of other tests in order to verify the statistical ro-
bustness of our results. In panel F of Table 3 we replace our dependent variable with a count of
the number of conflict starts in region i in year t. Similarly, in panel G, we replace the dependent
variable with a count of the number of conflicts that continue into year t, having started in an ear-
lier year. Both specifications give positive results, suggesting that the impact of 1807 on conflict
on both the extensive and intensive margins.
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We conduct a placebo analysis that we report in Figure 4. We re-estimate (2) using alternative
years as the break-point. As shown in the figure, we only find a statistically significant break if we
test for one in a narrow band around 1807.
In the appendix, we report additional statistical checks. We show that normalizing the conflicts
by population (Table A5) or by area (Table A6) has little effect on the results.8 Further, we report
Prais–Winsten estimates of our main results in Table A7. We include a lagged dependent variable
in Table A8. In Table A9, we exclude observations within 3 years of 1807. In each of these
cases, the results are substantively similar to our baseline results. Similarly, controlling for annual
average temperature across slave trade ports reported by Mann et al. (1998) does not change the
main result (Table A10). Using a tobit estimator rather than ordinary least squares does not change
the sign or significance of our results (Table A11).
In addition, we employ alternative strategies to identify the break after 1807. We report results
from a Clemente et al. (1998) additive outlier unit root test for the conflicts in our “NearPort”
region, for the period extending 40 years on either side of 1807. The test indeed finds that there
is a structural break, and selects 1807 as the optimal year. This is reported in Figure A.2, in the
appendix. We employ the approach of Abadie et al. (2010) to construct a synthetic control group
over the same interval. We divide Africa outside of our near-port region into 5◦ × 5◦ squares (see
Figure A.3 in the Appendix). We generate weights for the synthetic control group using either their
geographic characteristics or the incidence of intra-African conflict before 1807. In neither case
does the synthetic control group experience an increase in conflict after 1807 that resembles the
increase in the near-port area (see figure A.4 in the Appendix).9
Finally, we also test whether redefining the treatment area in an alternative way changes our re-
sults. We divide our area of analysis into 5 degree by 5 degree grid squares, and redefine treatment
to be (continuous) distance from the coast (normalized by standard deviation of coastal distance).
Results are presented in Table A1 and are consistent with our main result. The coefficient on the
interaction between distance to the coast and the post-1807 dummy variable is negative and statis-
tically significant, indicating that areas further from the coast experience relatively lower increases
in conflict after 1807 compared to areas closer to the coast, and that this pattern was particular
to conflicts involving only African parties. In Table A1, we also present results from the same
specification but instead dividing the area of analysis into 1 degree by 1 degree grid squares, and
those too are consistent with our main results.
8Areas of the NearPort and Comparison regions are computed in ArcMap. Total populations are computed by multi-
plying these areas by the population densities estimated by averaging over raster cells for population density in 1800
reported by Klein Goldewijk et al. (2011).
9In a similar exercise (Table A12), we divide both the near-port and comparison regions into 5◦ × 5◦ squares. We run
separate regressions a) discarding any regions that experienced no conflict in the century leading up to 1807, and b)
including only these regions. We find that conflict after 1807 increased in both samples, and that the increase is larger
in areas that had no conflict prior to 1807. Also note that normalizing conflicts by population in each region would
have no effect, since it would simply involve dividing the outcome variable by a constant for both regions.
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3.3. Alternative interpretations. We recognize that, in addition to the Slave Trade Act, suppres-
sion included other components such as the American abolition of slave imports from 1808 and
prohibitions on British engagement with foreign slave trades after 1806. Here, we are address other
possible explanations of the increase in conflict that did not result from suppression.
3.3.1. Measurement of conflicts. It is possible that a greater number of documentary sources were
produced after 1807 in which intra-African conflicts were recorded. More missionaries and ex-
plorers, for example, may have visited Africa. Warneck (1901, p. 188-236), Sundkler and Steed
(2000), and Gammell (1854), however, reveal the slow progress of missionaries in West Africa,
outside of Sierra Leone, which we discard in Appendix Table A13.10 Further, we show in the
appendix that conflicts do not move further from the coast after 1807, as would be expected if
Europeans were recording more wars as they gained better knowledge about the interior (Table
A15). Discarding all conflicts within 250 km of the routes of major explorers between 1807 and
1847 mapped by Century Company (1911) does not substantially change the results (Table A16),
nor does controlling for the stock of accumulated explorer visits in each region (Table A17).
3.3.2. Colonialism and European intervention. Increasing colonial encroachment by Europeans
after 1807 may have instigated conflict. We show in Appendix Table A13 that the results are similar
if these countries identified by Olsson (2009) as colonized between 1807 and 1840 are discarded
from the analysis. In panel H of Table 3 we show further that conflict between Europeans and
Africans does not increase discontinuously after 1807. In a similar placebo exercise, we re-define
our “near port” and “comparison” groups by their distance to Red Sea, rather than Atlantic slave
ports. We show in Table A14 in the Appendix that intra-African conflicts do not increase around
the Red Sea after 1807. To show that white expansion in South Africa is not driving the results, we
show in panel I of Table 3 that we continue to find an increase in conflict after 1807 when South
Africa is excluded from the analysis. Similarly, discarding intra-African conflicts within 500km of
a conflict involving non-Africans within the past year gives results similar to the baseline (Table
A18), as does simply controlling for the number of non-African conflicts (Table A19).
3.3.3. Jihad. The early nineteenth century was a period of jihad throughout West Africa (Curtin,
1971). While some of these movements may have been influenced by changes in the structure of
the slave trade, we wish to show that these do not fully account for our main result. To show this,
we discard the “Islamic” zone mapped by Bartholomew and Brooke (1918) from our analysis in
panel J of Table 3. The results remain similar to our baseline.
3.3.4. The Napoleonic Wars. It is unlikely that our results wrongly attribute the effects of the
Napoleonic Wars to suppression of the slave trade. In Figures 3 and 4, the break in intra-African
conflict is concentrated around 1807, rather than around 1793 or 1815. Results remain similar to
10In addition we show in Figure A.5 that the Google Ngrams Viewer reports no increase in the number of books
published after 1807 that mention Africa.
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the baseline if we drop from our sample regions in which France was the dominant shipper from
the nearest port (Table A20).
4. MECHANISMS
4.1. Overview. We use Table 4 and Figure 5 to show that both West Africa and Southeast/West-
Central Africa experienced increases in violence. The break is larger in Southeast and West-Central
Africa, and the difference is statistically significant. Militarization increased across the continent
after 1807 (Reid, 2012). Lovejoy (1989) in particular claims that the collapse of the Lunda states,
the jihads in West Africa, the activities of the Cokwe, insecurity in Igboland, and enslavement
during the Yoruba wars are all examples of violence shaped by the slave trade and its suppression.
The fundamental difference between the two regions is the nature of the demand shift after
1807. Although West African slave exports declined after 1807, West-Central Africa and Southeast
Africa expanded their involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. Lovejoy and Richardson (1995a)
document that, in West Africa, the real prices of slaves fell due to the suppression of demand. In
the rest of Africa, real slave prices rose after 1807, as demand was diverted southwards.
In both regions, suppression upset the status quo. As political actors adjusted to the change,
violence was the result. Political authorities in both regions were compelled to adapt to changing
circumstances. In both regions, the response included a greater resort to conflict. Where demand
for slaves increased, slaves were produced through violence. Where demand fell, existing authori-
ties saw their power threatened and used violence to maintain it.
4.2. West Africa. Responses by existing authorities to the disruption of the slave trade increased
violence in West Africa. The internal use of slaves in both production and combat increased,
and violent enslavement remained worthwhile. Despite the declining external demand for slaves,
revenues from their sale remained important in securing imported materials such as horses and
guns that states relied on to preserve their power.
4.2.1. Power of states. States in Africa differed from those in Europe. Austin (2009) argues that
major states did have power structures that were both autonomous from and dominant over kinship
systems, but that rather than exercising a “monopoly” of violence, states held only a “comparative
advantage” in it. In particular, the literature acknowledges that in an environment of land abun-
dance, in which farmers could easily outmigrate, political organizations in Africa did not exercise
exclusive control of territory, but instead secured control of people through loyalty, coercion, and
the completion of infrastructure, in particular roads that allowed for access and troop movement
(Herbst, 2014).
Many African states relied on the slave trade as a source of power. In Senegambia, for example,
Klein (1972, p. 422-3) argues that the slave trade had strengthened political authorities by provid-
ing horses and firearms, elevating the warrior and noble classes above the peasantry, and enabling
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FIGURE 5. West Africa v. West-Central and Southeastern Africa
The lines in this figure represent predicted values from results presented in column 4 of Table 4. Points corre-
spond to raw data.
rulers to redistribute wealth in order to solve internal tensions and conflicts. Declining Atlantic de-
mand for slaves thus threatened the power of these states. Lovejoy and Richardson (1995b, p. 42)
suggest that “[a]ll the states in the immediate interior of the Gold Coast and the Bights of Benin
and Biafra appear to have experienced political unrest in the period.” In Asante, rulers had used the
slave trade to bolster their power by redistributing profits to their loyal supporters (Aidoo, 1977).
Throughout West Africa, abolition also restricted the availability of imported currencies such as
cowries and copper (Hogendorn and Gemery, 1981).
States were forced to react to these changes. Historical literature on Africa after 1807, for
example Lovejoy (2011) or Law (2002), refers to this period as a “crisis of adaptation.” The shock
of 1807 reduced Asante imports by £200,000 to £400,000 per year. The state needed to reduce
consumption to maintain the trade balance, and accomplished this through a combination of force
and fear, collecting more taxes and attempting to tighten its monopoly on trade (Whatley, 2011).
The collapse of Oyo and subsequent civil war were due in part to the state’s loss of revenue from
the slave trade (Reid, 2012). Smith (1971, p. 187-8) cites over-dependence of the state on the slave
trade and its decline after 1807 as a reason for the collapse of Oyo. Law (1977, p. 255), similarly,
argues that a decline in slave exports from the 1790s onwards cut into the revenues of the central
16 JAMES FENSKE AND NAMRATA KALA
state, which led to greater taxation of the outlying regions that soon rebeled against Oyo rule.
Osadolor (2001) provides a similar narrative for the Benin Kingdom. The extraordinary power
struggles that plagued the state in the nineteenth century were driven by an economic crisis, which
“was the impact of commercial transition, of which the ruling aristocracy attempted to balance
economic interests and domestic political constraints through the reorganization of power and the
search for a military strategy capable of protecting vital interests” (p. 172).
States’ relative loss of power was destabilizing. In Asante, abolition of the export trade made
slaveholding affordable for commoners, weakening the relative power of the elite (Whatley, 2011).
In Senegambia, Curtin (1981) suggests that the gradual decline of the slave trade and the pro-
gressive shift towards the production of cash crops put European goods, most notably guns, in the
hands of the peasantry. As authorities became more oppressive due to their declining revenues, this
enabled peasants to respond by supporting Muslim clerics that challenged royal authority. Klein
(1972, p. 424) takes a similar view, arguing that “the peanut trade put money, and thus guns, in the
hands of peasants.”
4.2.2. Internal use of slaves. Enslavement increased throughout Africa after 1807 (Lovejoy, 1989,
p. 390). By the end of the nineteenth century, slaves accounted for between 18% and 35% of the
population in several parts of West Africa (Lovejoy, 1989, p. 391-2). Many of these slaves were
captured violently. Further, the slave raiding and pillaging that were widespread in the nineteenth
century did not require destroying the enemy, and so left open the possibility for later conflict
(Klein, 1972, p. 426).
Some historians have argued that the value of slaves in production created an incentive for
continued raiding. In Sokoto, for example, slave farms were often acquired through warfare and
raiding, and were concentrated in the hands of political leaders (Lovejoy, 1978). However, it is
also possible that commodity reduction reduced conflict by lowering the revenue pressures on local
states. We test for this in Table 4, using data from the FAO-GAEZ to divide the near-port region
into areas suitable for the cultivation of oil crops and those that are not. Palm oil was Africa’s most
important agricultural export in the period after 1807 (Lynn, 2002). We find that the effect of 1807
on conflict was attenuated in these areas.11
More importantly, then, slaves were valuable as soldiers. The infantry of savannah states such
as Borno and Bagirmi consisted largely of slaves, while the Oyo cavalry was made up of Nupe,
Hausa and Borno slaves (Smith, 1989, p. 43). In Sokoto, the use of slave cavalry provided the
Caliph with a regular military contingent, and slaves regularly passed their plunder on to their
owners (Smaldone, 1977, p. 135). In Masina, a successful campaign using slaves as soldiers could
11In similar exercises (Tables A22 and A23), we find that the increase in conflict after 1807 was similarly attenuated in
regions suitable for cotton production or where pre-colonial states reported by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013)
were present. Because of the concern that oil-crop suitability differs between West-Africa and the rest of the continent,
we also disaggregate these results by West-Africa and West-Central/Southeast Africa (Table A21). This pattern still
holds, but the conflict-dampening effects of palm oil are weaker in West Africa.
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pay for itself (Johnson, 1976, p. 485). Yorubaland became militarized, and the internal use of
slaves was a critical part of this process. Because war provided both slaves and other resources,
“economic considerations were as important as the political ones in determining the issues of war
and peace” (Awe, 1973). Slaves and other resources were sought in war, kidnapping, and raids
(Falola, 1994).
4.2.3. Access to firearms and horses. Despite suppression of the slave trade, slaves remained an
important means of acquiring firearms and horses. States along the Gold and Slave Coasts were de-
pendent on imported firearms throughout the eighteenth century (Osadolor, 2001; Richards, 1980).
Firearms and horses were expensive, and usually imported, either from the coast or over the Sahara
(Law, 1976; Smith, 1989). Horses were imported due to their vulnerability to sleeping sicknesses
spread by tsetse flies (Smith, 1989, p. 89-90).
Firearms were essential during the nineteenth century, prompting states to continue their efforts
at enslavement despite depressed prices (Smith, 1989, p.31). Tellingly, gunpowder shipments
to Africa did not fall after 1807 (Whatley, 2011). A nineteenth-century state that could neither
acquire firearms or horses risked military defeat, as in the case of Masina (Johnson, 1976, p. 495).
Similarly, the use of regular cavalry by jihadists as early as 1817 “entailed a fundamental change
in the nature of the insurgents’ military organization” (Smaldone, 1977, p. 32). For Sokoto, like
earlier Sudanic states, the supply of horses was a key priority. These were acquired through:
appropriation as taxation, tribute, and war booty from the vanquished; selective and systematic
local breeding, and; interstate and inter-emirate commerce (Smaldone, 1977, p. 48).
4.3. West-Central and Southeast Africa. In West-Central and Southeast Africa, the increased
demand for slaves was met in part through greater violent enslavement. Increased demand came
from greater Portuguese and Brazilian purchases, and expansion of slave trading in the interior
for African use. Miller (1996) provides a similar account. Warlords gained political importance,
controlling (for example) the trade in ivory. In Gordon’s view,
The British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 intensified the slave trade in the
south-central interior, resulting in new forms of violence that eroded the control
of Luba and Lunda rulers over trade and agricultural production, widened social
cleavages, and empowered gun-wielding warlords. (p. 937)
Although his focus is on the Indian Ocean slave trade later in the nineteenth century, Reid (2007)
highlights an analogous role of slave demand in East African conflicts. Traders such as Tippu Tip
wrought “violent and rapid economic upheaval” in the northern Lake Tanganyika area, in their
attempts secure dominance of the slave and ivory trades (p. 113). States such as Buganda saw the
revenues from sale of captives as a benefit of violence, while some non-state groups and communi-
ties devoted themselves entirely to raiding others for sale (p.119). In South Africa, Cobbing (1988)
argues that slave demand at Delagoa Bay and Griqua slave raids were the main pressures driving
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conflict in the region. The Zulu actively raided their neighbors for slaves to meet this demand.
Gordon (2009) adds that British curtailment of slave imports into the Cape after 1806 prompted
white farmers to turn to the interior for their supplies of slaves. Although this view is controver-
sial, Cobbing’s opponents have come to recognize the importance of slave exports in sustaining
the Ngoni wars (Eldredge, 1992; Hamilton, 1992; Omer-Cooper, 1993).
5. CONCLUSION
We have shown that British suppression of the slave trade precipitated an increase in the preva-
lence of intra-African conflict. The effect we find is large; after 1807, the incidence of conflict
roughly doubled in regions affected by the slave trade. This pattern is robust to multiple alternative
specifications, and cannot be explained by other contemporaneous events, such as colonial intru-
sion, jihad, or missionary expansion. Of course, there are limitations to our analysis. Because we
lack data on belligerents’ aims and conflict outcomes, direct evidence on the mechanisms for this
increase in violence must come from the secondary literature. 1807 was a unique event. This pre-
vents us from making a more general inference about the relationship of the slave trade and warfare
in Africa over the longer run. Despite these concerns, our results have general implications. Both
positive and negative shocks, then, play a role in generating conflict. The mechanisms we highlight
are an increase in the returns to violence and the challenge of responding to economic change. In
both directions, the “crisis of adaptation” spurred conflict. Our study thus contributes to the un-
derstanding of historical conflict in Africa. To the extent that historical conflict is associated with
present conflict and therefore with worse modern development outcomes, our study contributes to
a deeper understanding of the causes of both modern conflict and development.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean s.d. Min Max N
Summary statistics
Comparison/Pre 0.041 0.20 0 1 49
Comparison/Post 0.061 0.32 0 2 49
NearPort/Pre 1.04 0.76 0 4 49
NearPort/Post 3 1.29 1 6 49
T-tests: Equality of means
NearPort v. Comparison: Pre 8.88
NearPort v. Comparison: Post 15.48
Pre v. Post: Comparison 0.38
Pre v. Post: NearPort 9.15
Table 1. Summary statistics: Number of African-only conflicts, 1757-1857
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.958*** 2.310*** 2.206*** 2.140*** 2.260*** 2.124***
(0.320) (0.336) (0.308) (0.267) (0.254) (0.279)
NearPort 1.375*** 1.190*** 1.154*** 1.194*** 1.083*** 0.976***
(0.171) (0.160) (0.140) (0.128) (0.133) (0.139)
Year 0.022 0.028* 0.019* 0.008 0.009 0.000
(0.020) (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Post -0.400 -0.626* -0.434 -0.208 -0.300 -0.008
(0.320) (0.359) (0.279) (0.219) (0.235) (0.285)
NearPort X Post 1.508* 1.352* 1.800*** 2.004*** 1.833*** 2.150***
(0.821) (0.713) (0.610) (0.540) (0.517) (0.568)
NearPort 1.157*** 0.724** 0.955*** 1.127*** 0.873*** 0.988***
(0.250) (0.324) (0.281) (0.223) (0.256) (0.311)
Year 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.003 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Post -0.175 -0.148 -0.231 -0.140 -0.087 -0.021
(0.165) (0.137) (0.148) (0.105) (0.091) (0.094)
NearPort X Year 0.029 0.047 0.016 0.004 0.012 -0.001
(0.038) (0.032) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
NearPort X Post 1.496* 1.369* 1.840*** 2.025*** 1.863*** 2.216***
(0.850) (0.734) (0.623) (0.546) (0.513) (0.523)
NearPort 1.199*** 0.645** 0.718*** 0.976*** 0.626** 0.355
(0.256) (0.271) (0.272) (0.256) (0.283) (0.237)
Year 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Post -0.162 -0.139 -0.240 -0.142 -0.086 -0.021
(0.152) (0.126) (0.155) (0.106) (0.088) (0.092)
NearPort X Year 0.024 0.055* 0.035 0.015 0.026* 0.031***
(0.044) (0.029) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010)
(Year-1807) X Post -0.013 -0.009 0.009 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post 0.012 -0.017 -0.040 -0.021 -0.029 -0.066***
(0.066) (0.062) (0.041) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2. Main Results
Number of intra-African conflicts
Specification 1
Specification 2
Specification 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.833*** 2.214*** 2.129*** 2.075*** 2.204*** 2.027***
(0.308) (0.332) (0.306) (0.265) (0.254) (0.276)
NearPort X Post 1.958*** 2.324*** 1.991*** 1.634*** 1.488*** 1.402***
(0.472) (0.444) (0.396) (0.357) (0.321) (0.309)
NearPort X Post 1.958*** 2.317*** 2.098*** 1.887*** 1.874*** 1.763***
(0.352) (0.344) (0.316) (0.292) (0.264) (0.254)
NearPort X Post 0.425 0.860** 0.922*** 0.503 0.541* 0.596*
(0.348) (0.339) (0.333) (0.323) (0.306) (0.307)
NearPort X Post 1.958*** 2.310*** 2.286*** 2.206*** 2.317*** 2.174***
(0.320) (0.336) (0.306) (0.266) (0.254) (0.280)
NearPort X Post 0.825** 0.869*** 0.775*** 0.613** 0.554** 0.534**
(0.375) (0.305) (0.279) (0.261) (0.239) (0.217)
NearPort X Post 1.133*** 1.440*** 1.431*** 1.527*** 1.706*** 1.591***
(0.221) (0.233) (0.223) (0.201) (0.184) (0.201)
NearPort X Post 0.183 0.043 0.026 0.287 0.244 0.462
(0.367) (0.322) (0.305) (0.344) (0.311) (0.293)
NearPort X Post 0.683** 1.055*** 1.043*** 1.138*** 1.372*** 1.348***
(0.291) (0.309) (0.272) (0.241) (0.235) (0.236)
NearPort X Post 1.833*** 2.271*** 2.222*** 2.156*** 2.303*** 2.139***
(0.334) (0.364) (0.335) (0.304) (0.278) (0.284)
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table 3. Robustness checks
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are
estimated using ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors. Other
Comparisons, not reported, are NearPort, Year, and Post.
F. Conflict starts
G. Conflict continuations
E. Including the matrilineal belt as "NearPort"
J. Excluding Islamic Regions
H. Number of non-African conflicts as dependent variable
A. NearPort measured by distance from coast
B. 500 km cutoff
C. 500 km cutoff without 500-1000km zone
I. Excluding South Africa
D. NearPort measured by country having slave port
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post X West Africa 0.550* 0.705** 0.643*** 0.638*** 0.744*** 0.774***
(0.331) (0.285) (0.246) (0.207) (0.195) (0.186)
NearPort X Post X SEA/SWA 1.408*** 1.605*** 1.563*** 1.502*** 1.516*** 1.351***
(0.245) (0.306) (0.271) (0.239) (0.214) (0.224)
P-Value 0.040 0.033 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.048
NearPort X Post X Oil suitable 0.271 0.302* 0.363** 0.335** 0.344*** 0.302***
(0.212) (0.176) (0.156) (0.135) (0.123) (0.111)
NearPort X Post X Oil unsuitable 1.688*** 2.007*** 1.843*** 1.804*** 1.915*** 1.823***
(0.310) (0.299) (0.289) (0.247) (0.229) (0.253)
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 124 164 204 244 284 324
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table 4. Mechanisms
Number of intra-African conflicts
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors. Other Comparisons, not reported, are
NearPort X Group 1, NearPort X Group 2, Group 1, Group 2, Year, and Post.
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FIGURE A.1. Slave exports and distance from coast
Notes: This figure plots the cumulative percentage of all exports in the
Indian Ocean and Atlantic slave trades, reported in Nunn and Wantchekon
(2011), against the distance of each ethnic group centroid from the coast.
1807: ECONOMIC SHOCKS, CONFLICT AND THE SLAVE TRADE 31
FIGURE A.2. Clemente-Montan˜e´s-Reyes Unit Root Test
This graph reports the t-statistic resulting from a test for a breakpoint in the year indicated on the x-axis.
32 JAMES FENSKE AND NAMRATA KALA
FIGURE A.3. Regions for synthetic control analysis
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FIGURE A.4. Results of synthetic control analysis
This figure reports the results of a synthetic control analysis using the method of Abadie et al. (2010). The
weights for the “geographic predictors” synthetic control group are constructed using population density in
1700, malaria suitability, ruggedness, humidity, rainfall, temperature, constraints on agriculture, and elevation.
The weights for the “conflict predictors” synthetic control group are constructed using the number of intra-
African conflicts every five years from 1775 to 1805.
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FIGURE A.5. Interest in Africa over time
The n-gram score is the fraction of books in English reported by the Google Ngrams Viewer to contain the word
“Africa”.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment X Post -0.0168* -0.0185** -0.0152* -0.0139* -0.0138* -0.0128*
(0.00902) (0.00872) (0.00790) (0.00726) (0.00706) (0.00675)
Treatment X Post -0.00364 -0.00345 -0.00368 -0.00416 -0.00464 -0.00685
(0.00511) (0.00457) (0.00398) (0.00402) (0.00401) (0.00423)
Observations 4,216 5,576 6,936 8,296 9,656 11,016
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Treatment X Post -0.0322* -0.0363** -0.0308* -0.0286* -0.0287* -0.0264*
(0.0183) (0.0176) (0.0162) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0143)
Treatment X Post -0.00846 -0.00821 -0.00889 -0.0103 -0.0112 -0.0157*
(0.0111) (0.00930) (0.00825) (0.00762) (0.00799) (0.00848)
Observations 2,015 2,665 3,315 3,965 4,615 5,265
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Using 5 degree by 5 degree grid squares as unit of analysis
Number of intra-African conflicts
Number of non intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, with standard errors
clustered at the grid point level in parentheses.
Table A1. Continuous Treatment
Using 1 degree by 1 degree grid squares as unit of analysis
Number of intra-African conflicts
Number of non intra-African conflicts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.958*** 2.310*** 2.206*** 2.140*** 2.260*** 2.124***
(0.307) (0.288) (0.291) (0.243) (0.229) (0.245)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.508** 1.352** 1.800*** 2.004*** 1.833*** 2.150***
(0.655) (0.613) (0.540) (0.463) (0.456) (0.484)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.496** 1.369** 1.840*** 2.025*** 1.863*** 2.216***
(0.727) (0.640) (0.578) (0.490) (0.448) (0.461)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A2. Bootstrapped Standard Errors
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with standard errors estimated through 999 bootstrap replications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.692*** 2.124*** 1.591*** 1.234*** 1.144*** 1.150***
(0.483) (0.464) (0.441) (0.391) (0.346) (0.328)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
0 to 500 Km X Post 1.727*** 1.980*** 1.902*** 1.801*** 1.738*** 1.760***
(0.432) (0.412) (0.363) (0.330) (0.300) (0.284)
500 to 1000 Km X Post -0.169 -0.296 -0.130 0.132 0.221 0.356
(0.341) (0.321) (0.290) (0.262) (0.242) (0.235)
1000 to 1500 Km X Post -0.169 -0.289 -0.198 -0.088 -0.136 0.020
(0.228) (0.202) (0.166) (0.143) (0.131) (0.134)
1500 to 2000 Km X Post -0.231 -0.337 -0.236 -0.120 -0.164 -0.028
(0.240) (0.210) (0.172) (0.149) (0.136) (0.139)
Distance Band Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 124 164 204 244 284 324
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A3. Alternative NearPort Definitions
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
A. NearPort measured as 250 km from coast
B. NearPort measured using distance bands
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 1.333 1.205* 1.569** 1.865*** 1.746*** 2.129***
(0.804) (0.699) (0.592) (0.530) (0.509) (0.560)
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
Post 1.334 1.231* 1.601** 1.884*** 1.776*** 2.194***
(0.837) (0.723) (0.603) (0.536) (0.506) (0.515)
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 31 41 51 61 71 81
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A4. Removing the Comparison group
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.038***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 0.033* 0.029** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 0.032* 0.029** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.041***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A5. Normalize by population
Number of intra-African conflicts per million persons
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 0.146*** 0.171*** 0.162*** 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.157***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 0.115* 0.103* 0.137*** 0.151*** 0.137*** 0.159***
(0.061) (0.053) (0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 0.114* 0.104* 0.141*** 0.152*** 0.139*** 0.164***
(0.063) (0.055) (0.047) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A6. Normalize by area
Number of intra-African conflicts per million square km
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.950*** 2.094*** 2.169*** 2.108*** 2.201*** 2.003***
(0.293) (0.365) (0.314) (0.274) (0.260) (0.332)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.574** 1.181* 1.693*** 1.898*** 1.826*** 1.820***
(0.604) (0.688) (0.626) (0.547) (0.516) (0.640)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.566** 1.183* 1.726*** 1.917*** 1.850*** 1.997***
(0.616) (0.696) (0.621) (0.546) (0.507) (0.550)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 60 80 100 120 140 160
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A7. Prais-Winsten Estimation
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
Prais-Winsten estimation and allowing errors to follow an AR(1) structure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.814*** 1.508*** 1.874*** 1.789*** 1.910*** 1.359***
(0.522) (0.516) (0.445) (0.387) (0.376) (0.425)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.418 1.048 1.519** 1.654*** 1.634*** 1.379**
(0.882) (0.676) (0.639) (0.604) (0.534) (0.529)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.415 1.048 1.551** 1.674*** 1.668*** 1.605***
(0.898) (0.678) (0.648) (0.609) (0.524) (0.509)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 60 80 100 120 140 160
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A8. Including lag intra-African conflicts
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 2.083*** 2.471*** 2.318*** 2.222*** 2.344*** 2.189***
(0.307) (0.352) (0.320) (0.271) (0.259) (0.286)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 2.117 1.529 2.228*** 2.430*** 2.097*** 2.518***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.705) (0.565) (0.570) (0.639)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 2.117* 1.529 2.228*** 2.430 2.097*** 2.518***
(1.158) (0.000) (0.705) (0.000) (0.556) (0.559)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 48 68 88 108 128 148
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A9. Removing observations within 3 years of 1807
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.958*** 2.310*** 2.206*** 2.140*** 2.260*** 2.124***
(0.320) (0.335) (0.306) (0.264) (0.253) (0.279)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.508* 1.352* 1.800*** 2.004*** 1.833*** 2.150***
(0.816) (0.710) (0.603) (0.530) (0.513) (0.565)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.496* 1.369* 1.840*** 2.025*** 1.863*** 2.216***
(0.838) (0.724) (0.614) (0.536) (0.509) (0.524)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A10. Control for temperature
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 5.908*** 6.999*** 2.113*** 2.034*** 2.209*** 2.536***
(0.120) (0.127) (0.791) (0.727) (0.759) (0.751)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 7.911*** 9.371*** 7.183*** 4.432*** 3.476** 2.469*
(0.132) (0.141) (2.195) (1.431) (1.542) (1.364)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 5.745*** 6.165*** 8.512** 4.242*** 3.478*** 2.558**
(0.146) (0.165) (3.408) (1.009) (1.031) (1.098)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A.11 Tobit
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
a tobit, with robust standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 0.621** 0.857*** 0.765*** 0.739*** 0.859*** 0.899***
(0.299) (0.269) (0.242) (0.205) (0.197) (0.190)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.337*** 1.452*** 1.442*** 1.401*** 1.401*** 1.226***
(0.199) (0.224) (0.212) (0.189) (0.167) (0.181)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A12. 5⁰ x 5⁰ cells by pre-1807 conflict
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
Cells with no pre-1807 conflict
Cells with pre-1807 conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 2.146*** 2.452*** 2.242*** 2.003*** 2.029*** 1.923***
(0.336) (0.341) (0.315) (0.294) (0.275) (0.277)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.808** 1.667** 2.228*** 2.561*** 2.343*** 2.444***
(0.885) (0.746) (0.661) (0.612) (0.574) (0.587)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.783* 1.668** 2.272*** 2.607*** 2.397*** 2.520***
(0.910) (0.770) (0.667) (0.608) (0.552) (0.528)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A13. Removing countries colonized between 1807 and 1840
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 0.133 -0.000 -0.002 -0.168 -0.060 -0.051
(0.140) (0.142) (0.148) (0.157) (0.152) (0.139)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post -0.142 0.086 0.068 0.303 -0.010 -0.033
(0.211) (0.126) (0.196) (0.228) (0.230) (0.196)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post -0.181 0.095 0.087 0.342** 0.015 -0.026
(0.000) (0.000) (0.138) (0.160) (0.197) (0.179)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A14. Conflicts near Red Sea Ports as a Placebo
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
     Panel A. NearPort Group
Post 25.899 -126.657 -144.845 -191.214** -149.128* -134.696*
(82.822) (99.514) (93.548) (90.718) (85.910) (79.093)
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
Post 23.156 -111.727 -133.816 -184.339** -146.240* -132.281*
(79.746) (92.216) (89.377) (87.658) (83.385) (74.721)
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
     Panel B. NearPort and Comparison Groups
Post 25.899 -126.657 -157.248 -216.851** -161.537* -134.948*
(82.822) (99.514) (94.915) (92.764) (87.004) (78.832)
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
Post 23.156 -111.727 -147.925 -213.264** -159.899* -132.961*
(79.746) (92.216) (92.512) (91.791) (85.694) (75.785)
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 31 41 51 61 70 79
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A15. Wars do not move further from the coast
Average distance of wars from the coast, by year
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least
squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.892*** 2.110*** 1.966*** 1.906*** 2.002*** 1.899***
(0.302) (0.352) (0.312) (0.265) (0.245) (0.261)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.317* 1.381* 1.809*** 1.942*** 1.762*** 1.985***
(0.749) (0.696) (0.581) (0.518) (0.501) (0.549)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.287* 1.422** 1.870*** 1.975*** 1.802*** 2.054***
(0.768) (0.709) (0.584) (0.518) (0.481) (0.490)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A16. Removing conflicts within 250km of an explorer route
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.950*** 2.201*** 2.103*** 2.066*** 2.161*** 1.934***
(0.326) (0.342) (0.315) (0.278) (0.270) (0.304)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.519* 1.430** 1.854*** 2.029*** 1.847*** 2.170***
(0.816) (0.706) (0.607) (0.539) (0.517) (0.558)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.515* 1.506** 1.939*** 2.069*** 1.880*** 2.236***
(0.847) (0.735) (0.622) (0.544) (0.516) (0.518)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A17. Control for stock of explorer visits
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.887*** 2.207*** 2.125*** 2.039*** 2.144*** 2.024***
(0.305) (0.311) (0.287) (0.251) (0.236) (0.260)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.275 1.214* 1.649*** 1.916*** 1.763*** 2.048***
(0.791) (0.685) (0.589) (0.523) (0.494) (0.542)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.282 1.239* 1.686*** 1.937*** 1.794*** 2.111***
(0.814) (0.695) (0.598) (0.525) (0.484) (0.494)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A18. Discard conflicts within 500km of a non-African conflict
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.931*** 2.299*** 2.201*** 2.134*** 2.249*** 2.167***
(0.310) (0.319) (0.295) (0.271) (0.255) (0.273)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.444* 1.209* 1.735*** 2.006*** 1.832*** 2.125***
(0.777) (0.655) (0.575) (0.539) (0.515) (0.563)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.448* 1.219* 1.764*** 2.029*** 1.859*** 2.210***
(0.777) (0.616) (0.576) (0.542) (0.503) (0.525)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A19. Control for conflicts within 500km of a non-African conflict
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NearPort X Post 1.821*** 2.157*** 2.198*** 2.296*** 2.422*** 2.316***
(0.332) (0.324) (0.303) (0.264) (0.246) (0.272)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year N N N N N N
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.308 1.171 1.382** 1.454*** 1.470*** 1.857***
(0.877) (0.741) (0.633) (0.551) (0.519) (0.577)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post N N N N N N
NearPort X Post 1.264 1.169 1.441** 1.502*** 1.510*** 1.930***
(0.903) (0.767) (0.643) (0.554) (0.517) (0.531)
NearPort, Post, Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
(Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
NearPort X (Year-1807) X Post Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 62 82 102 122 142 162
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A20. Discard conflicts closest to French-dominated ports
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
West Africa X NearPort X Oil Suit. X Post 1.296*** 1.041*** 0.710** 0.617** 0.450* 0.256
(0.393) (0.381) (0.337) (0.293) (0.268) (0.269)
West Africa X NearPort X Oil Suit. -1.157*** -1.055*** -0.965*** -1.021*** -0.946*** -0.797***
(0.184) (0.168) (0.149) (0.132) (0.133) (0.137)
West Africa X NearPort X Post -1.124*** -0.982*** -0.837*** -0.771*** -0.628*** -0.438*
(0.322) (0.332) (0.289) (0.254) (0.235) (0.240)
NearPort X Oil Suit. X Post -1.341*** -1.336*** -1.079*** -1.041*** -0.999*** -0.885***
(0.222) (0.253) (0.238) (0.208) (0.187) (0.189)
West Africa X NearPort 1.225*** 1.088*** 1.027*** 1.081*** 0.991*** 0.880***
(0.164) (0.156) (0.134) (0.121) (0.127) (0.130)
West Africa X Oil Suit. -0.006 0.014 0.015 0.004 0.010 -0.010
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
West Africa X Post -0.035 -0.057 -0.070* -0.044 -0.049* -0.017
(0.039) (0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028)
NearPort X Oil Suit. -0.025 -0.007 -0.011 -0.015 -0.009 -0.023*
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
NearPort X Post 1.412*** 1.472*** 1.343*** 1.303*** 1.274*** 1.145***
(0.206) (0.232) (0.208) (0.183) (0.162) (0.168)
Oil Suit. X Post -0.035 -0.057 -0.070* -0.044 -0.049* -0.017
(0.039) (0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028)
Year 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 248 328 408 488 568 648
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A21. Mitigating effects of palm oil suitability by region
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using ordinary least
squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post X NearPort X Cotton Suitable 0.875*** 0.855*** 0.763*** 0.669*** 0.630*** 0.576***
(0.281) (0.258) (0.222) (0.202) (0.182) (0.165)
Post X NearPort X Cotton Unsuitable 1.083*** 1.455*** 1.443*** 1.471*** 1.629*** 1.548***
(0.294) (0.275) (0.245) (0.216) (0.207) (0.226)
Post X Cotton Suitable 0.062 0.048 0.118 0.099 -0.108* 0.050
(0.064) (0.063) (0.150) (0.136) (0.064) (0.145)
Post X Cotton Unsuitable 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.193 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.160) (0.138) (0.000) (0.143)
NearPort X Cotton Suitable 0.125 0.095 0.077 0.065 0.056 0.049
(0.094) (0.078) (0.058) (0.044) (0.039) (0.046)
NearPort X Cotton Unsuitable 1.250*** 1.095*** 1.077*** 1.129*** 1.028*** 0.927***
(0.176) (0.160) (0.139) (0.127) (0.133) (0.139)
Cotton Suitable -0.062 -0.048 -0.038 -0.032 -0.028 0.000
(0.093) (0.093) (0.076) (0.031) (0.065) (0.075)
Post -0.231 -0.337* -0.276 -0.153 0.000 -0.029
(0.204) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.000)
Year 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 124 164 204 244 284 324
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A22. Cotton Suitability
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post X NearPort X No State 1.350*** 1.505*** 1.402*** 1.270*** 1.342*** 1.298***
(0.267) (0.244) (0.221) (0.197) (0.192) (0.191)
Post X NearPort X State 0.346* 0.307* 0.365** 0.470*** 0.517*** 0.452***
(0.188) (0.158) (0.153) (0.135) (0.122) (0.118)
Post X No State -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.103** 0.000
(0.029) (0.026) (0.116) (0.095) (0.042) (0.104)
Post X State 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.103 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.095) (0.000) (0.104)
NearPort X No State 1.250*** 1.095*** 1.038*** 1.097*** 0.972*** 0.902***
(0.153) (0.149) (0.126) (0.116) (0.123) (0.121)
NearPort X State 0.188* 0.143* 0.115* 0.097 0.111** 0.098*
(0.104) (0.082) (0.067) (0.059) (0.056) (0.051)
No State 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.072) (0.067) (0.058) (0.009) (0.048) (0.050)
Post -0.141 -0.145 -0.126 -0.051 0.000 0.004
(0.148) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.099) (0.000)
Year 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.001
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 124 164 204 244 284 324
Window 15 20 25 30 35 40
Table A23. Centralization
Number of intra-African conflicts
Notes: *** Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% * Significant at 10%. All regressions are estimated using
ordinary least squares, with AR(1) Newey-West standard errors.
